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Basic Study on Presentation Attacks against Biometric Authentication using Photoplethysmogram Advanced Biomedical Engineering
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Basic Study on Presentation Attacks against Biometric Authentication using Photoplethysmogram

Shun Hinatsu, Daisuke Suzuki, Hiroki Ishizuka, Sei Ikeda, Osamu Oshiro
Vol. 10 (2021) p.101-112

Several kinds of biometric authentications have been used as countermeasures against identity spoofing. Recently, some approaches have utilized time-series biosignals for biometrics, and one of the approaches is photoplethysmogram (PPG)-based authentication. PPG sensing has the advantage of fewer restriction of measurement sites than other time-series physiological signals. Moreover, it can connect the authentication and the healthcare applications seamlessly with one sensor. However, identity spoofing against PPG-based authentication may occur by exploiting this advantage. To develop a PPG-based authentication system with countermeasures, we propose the feasibility of a presentation attack against PPG-based authentication. The attack stealthily records PPGs on non-genuine measurement sites, and transmits the signals to the authentication device, thereby utilizing the advantage of PPG sensing in which signals can be recorded on various sites of a subject’s body. We conducted an experiment to investigate the feasibility of the attack. We developed a PPG-based authentication system comprising a PPG sensing system including PPG sensors for multiple measurement sites, and an authentication algorithm based on an existing PPG-based identification algorithm. We recorded PPGs on three measurement sites on the subjects’ bodies using the developed system. Then, we investigated the feasibility of the attack by inputting the feature values extracted from the PPGs recorded on non-genuine measurement sites to the classifier generated by the values from the PPGs recorded on genuine measurement sites. The results indicate that the attack can occur within a short time without any mapping under an ideal condition. Therefore, countermeasures such as liveness detection and utilization of unique information of measurement sites are required against the attack.

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